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1. What This Paper Is Not About
Tiii TIThE of this conference brackets "capital formation" with
"economic growth" presumably because there is a causal or func-
tional relationshij between the two concepts, more specifically
because differences in levels, trends, and structure of capital forma-
tion influence the speed and character of economic growth. Similarly,
the selection of "sources and channels of finance in capitalist coun-
tries" as the topic of the first group of papers presumably reflects
the belief that the nature of these sources and channels has a bear-
ing on economic growth. This paper, therefore, should deal with
the effect of sources and channels of finance on the rapidity and
nature of economic growth in "advanced" capitalist countries, de-
fined as countries with a high value of real national product per
head and a fully developed financial system. In particular, the
paper should examine how and to what extent differences in financial
structure have been responsible for differences in the rate and char-
acter of economic growth. This examination, naturally, should run
in quantitative terms, i.e. it should relate certain measurable char-
acteristics of financial structure to a quantitative expression of eco-
nomic growth such as real national product per head.
The paper does not follow this straight path. Some of the reasons
are accidental, such as the extreme pressure of time under which
it was written. Others are more basic. First, there is no accepted
and tried kit of concepts for measuring financial structure and thus
distinguishing clearly and quantitatively changes in structure over
time or differences in structure between countries or regions. Sec-
ond, even if we hastily fashion some new tools—as will be done in
section 2—there is great difficulty in finding data for different dates
and different countries that are sufficiently comprehensive, detailed,
and comparable' to justify their application. Third, our measures of
economic growth are still so crude, particularly if we go back more
than a few decades, that differences—e.g. in the rate of increase of
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real product per head—must be pronounced and persistent to be
regarded as significant. Fourth, the number of "cases" from which
our generalizations would have to be drawn is woefully small—there
are less than a dozen countries that can be classified as "advanced,"
using the two criteria of high real income per head (high by inter-
national comparison) and a well-developed financial structure; and
most of these have been in this category for less than a century.
Fifth—and this will be the decisive consideration for theorists—
economic growth is so complex a phenomenon, obviously determined
or influenced by basic factors of a physical, technological, and
mass-psychological nature, that an attempt to isolate the effects of
apparently secondary forces such as the charaoter of financial in-
stitutions and the nature of credit practices does not promise success.
Indeed, if differences in financial structure affect economic growth,
such effects have a better chance of being identified and meas-
ured by contrasting "advanced" and "retarded," or capitalist and
socialist, countries as of today; or in comparing economic growth
in the now "advanced" countries before and after the industrial
revolution—both subjects excluded from the assigned scope of this
paper, even if I had felt bold enough to attack them. For an explana-
tion of the differences in the speed and character of economic growth
of "advanced" countries, financial factors will be, I am afraid, too
weak and blunt a tool until our knowledge of both the economic
growth and the financial structure of different countries is much
further advanced than it is now.
This pessimistic attitude is due in part to the absence of any
prima-facie evidence of a clear connection between the financial
structure and the rate of economic growth in "advanced" capitalist
countries during the past century.' In Table 1 the estimates available
Abramovitz has quite correctly pointed out that this attitude, as well as
the conclusions ofthis paper, might be different had it been possible to
investigate financial structure on a broader basis than I have been able to
investigate it here. This might be the case in particular if, in addition to the
sample balance sheet ratios used here, consideration had been given—in quantita-
tive tenns if that were possible—to the nature of the mechanism by which
funds are transferred from lenders to borrowers, following for example Abramo-
vitz's own stimulating suggestions in Survey of Contemporary Economics (Ber-
nard F. Haley, editor, Irwin, 1952, Vol. n, pp. 146 if.). It should be clear
to the reader that I am not dealing in this paper with finance or even financial
structure in the broadest sense of these terms, but only with one aspect of
them—the relationship between tangible and intangible assets in national and
group balance sheets—that seems to lend itself well to quantitative treatment






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in mid-1953 of growth in real national product since the middle of
the nineteenth century have been brought together for all countries
which can be regarded as "advanced" on the basis of the real in-
come criterion, i.e. countries having real income per head in 1949
of over $400,2 all of which (with the possible exception of New
Zealand) also meet the second definitional criterion, that of pos-
sessing a fully developed financial system.
The outstanding—and not unexpected—feature of this table is the
higher rate of growth of real national product, per head as well
as in the aggregate, of the United States and Canada compared with
the other "advanced" countries, most of which are situated in West-
ern or Central Europe. Is one seriously to believe that differences in
financial structure are responsible for this basic difference in the rate
of economic growth which has endured for most of a century, a
difference large enough to raise real income per head in the United
States within one century to three times that of most of the other ad-
vanced countries? How is one to explain the fact that the country
with a rate of growth nearest to the United States—Canada—has
quite a different financial structure, which in several respects (e.g.
concentration of commercial banking into a small number of nation-
wide institutions) is closer to European than American patterns?
Limiting attention to "advanced" countries in Europe, is there any-
thing in the financial structure of the Scandinavian countries or
Switzerland to account for their relatively rapid economic growth, or
in that of the Netherlands to explain the slow increase in national
product per head? The financial systems of Germany and Great
Britain have often been regarded as opposites, and much printers'
ink has been spilt, particularly before World War I, in using these
differences as an explanation of the two countries' relative growth.
In fact, both countries show not too different rates of growth of
real income, in the aggregate as well as per head, between the mid-
2SeeNational and Per Capita Incomes, Seventj Countries—1949, United
Nations, Statistical Papers, Series E J, Table 1. Germany is included because
it should by 1952 have reached a per head income of over $400 and obviously
belongs to this group. Luxembourg and Iceland, though meeting the income
criterion, have been omitted for lack of historical data and because it is doubt-
ful if they possess a fully developed financial system. Use of figures for one
year employing official exchange ratesto convert income estimates in na-
tional currencies into dollar figures is obviously open to criticism. The list of
"advanced" countries wouLd, however, be essentially the same had• it been
based on Clark's estimates for 1925-1934 in which an attempt is made to reduce
incomes to comparable "international units" (see Cohn Clark, The Conditions
of Economic Progress, 1st ed., London, Macmillan, 1940, p. 41).
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die of the nineteenth century and 19l3. Finally, the rate of growth
of real product per head was considerably higher from the third
quarter of the nineteenth century to World War I than in the fol-
lowing forty, years in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia, while the de-
cline was small, or entirely absent, in the United States, France,
Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway. Do these differences and group-
ings have a significant relation to financial structure?
In all these instances it can of course be argued that, while they
are not decisive, differences in financial structure have been an un-
portant contributing factor in determining rate of growth of real
national product, particularly if financial structure is defined more
broadly than in this paper. This possibility cannot be denied or
disproved. But neither can it be proven. Nor is it possible—and this
is more important—to isolate and measure the contribution of
financial factors. If we want to stay within the realm of measurable
facts we must, therefore, give up for the time being the attempt to
determine the differential effect of financial structure on economic
growth among advanced capitalist countries.
Thus we must trim our sails and be content with a much more
moderate contribution to the analysis of economic growth. We may
first ask what, theoretically, are the characteristics of financial struc-
ture which are influenced by and in turn affect the process of eco-
nomic growth? Second, we may see whether the financial structures
of advanced capitalist countries show sufficient common character-
istics and significant similarity in development for us to regard these
financial traits as "typical" components or accompaniments of their
economies and their development. It is to these two questions that
the rest of this paper is directed. Naturally, it cannot treat them
exhaustively or definitively. The very breadth and novelty of the
questions are sufficient to dispel any illusions on these counts. All
that can be done is to offer, in section 2, some suggestions of con-
cepts that might be used in a comparative morphology of financial
structure; to apply, in section 8, these concepts to changes in the
financial structure of the United States during the past century;
and to attempt, in section 4, a rapid glance at a few other important
advanced countries—Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands—
8Theadvocates of the German financial system, it is true, based their argu-
ments on differences in growth during the second half of this period. But for
the years 1890-1913 the increase in real national product per head seems to
have been only slightly higher in Germany (.9 per cent per year) than in
Great Britain (.7 per cent).
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in 1913 and at some more recent points of time, the selection of
dates as well as countries depending largely on availability of
data.
2. Elements of a Comparative Financial Morphology
A satisfactory quantitative comparison of the financial structures
of different countries at rest and in motion, i.e. a comparative
morphology and dynamic, requires for each of them and for a
considerable period of time (1) national balance sheets with fairly
detailed cross-classifications of intangible assets, liabilities, and equi-
ties by creditor (holder) and debtor (issuer) groups, and (2) use-
and-source-of -funds statements, on a gross basis, forall major
sectors of the economy by type of fund, thus permitting the con-
struction of a square flow table with as many rows and columns as
there are sectors to distinguish, a table which is formally quite
similar to the familiar input-output matrix for interindustrial rela-
tions. This section proceeds as if such statements existed and dis-
regards the numerous conceptual and practical problems involved
in their derivation. It explores measures that could be used in such
a situation to characterize financial structures and to compare them
among countries over time.
One of the basic relations characterizing the financial structure on
the national level is the ratio between intangible and tangible assets




if tangibles are regarded as including net foreign assets or obliga-
tions. It may be called the "financial interrelations ratio" because it
measures the extent to which tangible assets are overlaid by a net-
work of financial (intangible) claims, liabilities, and evidences of
ownership (equities). The ratio naturally is zero when there are no
intangibles, i.e. no financial interrelations, and national assets =na-
tional wealth, and is the higher the denser the net of financial in-
terrelations.
The financial interrelations ratio (henceforth designated as FIR)
is determined by the following factors :
1. The definition of independent economic units each of which
is supposed to have its own balance sheet. To cite only one ex-
The list is not exhaustive; some of the factors could well be further sub-
divided.
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ample: national assets, and hence FIR, are higher if unincorporated
businesses are regarded as separate entities than if their assets and
liabilities are treated as part of the balance sheet of proprietors, and
the difference is equal to the value of the equity in unincorporated
business enterprises which appears among proprietors' assets.
2. The definition of assets. Needless to say, both national assets
and national wealth, and hence FIR, are affected by the scope of
tangible and intangible assets included in the national balance
sheet. Liberal definition of intangibles (e.g. inclusion of good will
and similar assets or capitalization of claims of social security bene-
ficiaries in excess of fund assets) will necessarily increase both na-
tional assets and FIR. Broadening of the scope of tangibles, pri-
marily inclusion of consumer durables or of durable military assets,
on the other hand, will raise national assets and national wealth by
the same absolute amounts and thus will reduce FIR.
8. The valuation of assets. In periods of rising prices FIR cal-
culated on market prices (or reproduction cost)is likely to be
higher than if calculated on the basis of book values, i.e. original
cost, while the opposite relationship will prevail after a prolonged
fall in prices. The reason is that the book values of a large part of
intangibles, particularly short-term claims, adapt themselves rather
rapidly to changes in the general price level; whereas, such an
adaptation takes a long time for the bulk of tangible assets, i.e.
structures and equipment, though not for inventories.
4. The extent to which operation and ultimate ownership of tangi-
ble assets coincide. The greater the difference between the values
of the typical ultimate unit's (household and government) tangible
assets and its equity, i.e. the lower the ratio of tangible to total
assets in the typical ultimate unit's balance sheet, the larger the
proportion of intangible assets and liabilities necessary to bridge
the gap.
5. The degree of "layering" in the economy, i.e. the number of
links (independent units) in the chain between tangible assets and
ultimates. Two types of layering may profitably be distinguished.
The first is layering among major economic groups, i.e. the existence
of nonfinancial business enterprises and of financial institutions, the
former owning and operating part of tangible assets and the latter
providing part of the funds with which business enterprises acquire
tangible as well as intangible assets. The second is layering within
major economic sectors, i.e. the fact that there are financial interrela-
tions (creditor-debtor and owner-issuer relationships) among units
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belonging to the same sector, particularly among affiliated enter-
prises, between suppliers and customers, and among financial insti-
tutions. The extent of this intrasectoral layering is measured by the
ratio of the footings of a sector's combined and consolidated balance
sheets.
6. The size of the "dead-weight debt," i.e. debt that was incurred
without giving rise, as is the normal case, to assets of equal amount.5
The classical example of dead-weight debt is government borrowing
to defray military expenditures (except possibly expenditures on
durable military assets, which may be regarded as part of national
assets and wealth). But government or private debt incurred to
cover a current deficit, i.e. consumer debt in the narrower sense of
the word, belongs in the same category. Since dead-weight debt
increases the assets of its holders, and hence national assets, but
does not directly affect the level of national wealth, it raises FIR.°
Indeed, the increase in national assets may easily be far in excess
of the amount of dead-weight debt if part or all of the debt is
bought by the central bank and thus becomes the basis of multiple
expansion of assets and deposits within the banking system.
7. The extent of destruction of tangible assets by "acts of God
or the King's enemies," a contingency likely to arise in significant
The concept of dead-weight debt is not an easy one to handle, as Shaw's
comments indicate, but Istill believe that it has a place in the analysis of
financial interrelations and of the connection between financial structure and
economic growth. The adjective itself, which is taken from nineteenth century
British financial terminology, does not, of course, imply that such debt is
"dead" in the sense of being without influence on income, prices, output, and
many other economically relevant factors either at the time of its creation or
later. Differing from Shaw, I also believe that dead-weight debt can be de-
fined with as much precision as other economic and financial terms. It is simply
that part of liabilities which, at current valuations, is not covered by assets.
Hence, there is,strictly speaking, dead-weight debt fOr some units in every
sector. If we limit the term in statistical handling to the overindebtedness of
governments, or if we equate it sometimes in further simplification with the
total debt of the central government., we are applying statistical conventions
whose justification depends on how closely they reflect the actual situation.
Where sufficient data are available we do not have to treat the entire debt of
the central government, or of other issuer groups, as dead-weight or not dead-
weight, but can divide all holdings pro rata into parts that represent dead-weight
debt or other debt.
6Inreal life, issuance of large amounts of dead-weight debt is invariably
accompanied, sooner or later, by a rise in the price level. This rise may pos-
sibly be pronounced enough to raise the value of tangible assets so much that
FIR actually declines, at least until the volume of intangibles (other than
dead-weight debt) adjusts itself to the rise in price level. (In view of Shaw's
comment it may be well to emphasize that such a decline in FIR is likely to
be temporary and is not to be expected except during hyperinflation.)
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amounts oniy in major wars. In such a case FIR would rise, since
an unchanged volume of intangibles is compared with a shrunken
tangible asset base. Actually, war-caused destruction of tangible
assets (and the loss of net foreign assets, which is similar in its
effects) is likely to cause an even sharper increase in FIR, as it will
generally be accompanied by the creation of additional intangibles
in the form of war damage compensation claims or payments. (Two
examples, the British and Dutch situations after World War II,
will be found in section 4.)
8. The sudden and unilateral reduction of intangibles—the modern
form of seisachtheia—which often accompanies currency reforms
and repudiations of government debt. Such acion sometimes also
reduce the market value of tangibles; but generally much less than
corresponds to the shrinkage of intangibles, so that FIR falls
abruptly. (A classical case, the German currency reform of 1948,
is illustrated in section 4.)
9. Under customary accounting conventions, following legal ar-
rangements, rented real property does not appear in the balance
sheet of the tenant but oniy in the balance sheet of the landlord,
in which it is not distinguished from owner-operated property. As
a result, the proportion of real property rented is without influence
on FIR. The national balance sheet and FIR are thus invariant
to shifts between owner operation and tenancy and to differences
in the ratio of tenancy among countries, although such shifts and
differences are of great economic significance and of importance
for many aspects of financial structure. It is wbrth consideration
whether the national balance sheet should not depart from the
usual methods of business accounting by entering the value of
rented property on both sides of the tenant's balance sheet, as
a tangible asset on the left- and as a liability of equal size on the
right-hand side, and at the same time show it in the landlord's
balance sheet as a claim instead of a tangible asset. Under this
treatment, spread of tenancy would increase national assets and
FIR, though naturally leaving national wealth unchanged.
It may be well to illustrate these rather abstract considerations by
a set of extremely simplified specimens of financial structure on the
national level. They are all based on the assumptions that balance
sheets exist for all economic units and that valuations are uniform.
Only four sectors (groups of economic units) are distinguished:
ultimates (i.e. households and private nonprofit institutions), busi-
ness (nonfinancial corporations and unincorporated enterprises),
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financial intermediaries, and government. Business is supposed (ex-
cept in Specimens 6 and 7) to be entirely financed by intermediaries.
Financial intermediaries are assumed (except in Specimen 7), for
the sake of simplicity, to own intangible but no tangible assets, and
non-financial businesses to own tangible but no intangible assets. For
the same reason ultimates are assumed (again except in Specimen
7) to be free of debt, governments to have no assets and only dead-
weight debt, and financial intermediaries to be financed entirely by.
ultimates. Net foreign assets and liabilities are disregarded through-
out.
SPECIMEN 1






Financial interrelations ratio= 0
Share of financial intermediaries
in national assets = 0













Share of financial intermediaries
in national assets
= 2>( national wealth
=0
122SPECIMEN 3
Nonfinancial Enterprises Own All Tangible Assets; One Layer of Financial
Intermediaries Supplies All Funds to Enterprises; No Dead-Weight Debt
National assets
Financial interrelations ratio
Share of financial intermediaries
in national assets
Layering ratio among financial
intermediaries
SPECIMEN 4
Nonfinancial Enterprises Own All Tangible Assets; One Layer of Financial
Intermediaries Supplies All Funds to Enterprises; Dead-Weight Debt Equal
to One-Hall of Value of Tangible Assets Held Half by Financial Intermediaries
and Hall by Ultimate Owners
National assets
Financial interrelations ratio
Share of financial intermediaries
in national assets











Nonfinancial Enterprises Own All Tangible Assets; Multi-Layered Financial
Intermediaries Supply All Funds to Enterprises; No Dead-Weight Debt
in national assets
Layering ratio among financial
intermediaries
in national assets '76(approximately)
Layering ratio among financial
intermediaries
National assets —5X national wealth
Financial interrelations ratio=4
Share of financial intermediaries
=(% includingholding companies)
=2(3 including holding companies)
SPECIMEN 6
Ultiniates and Business Each Own One-Half of Tangible Assets; One Layer of
Financial Intermediaries; Dead-Weight Debt Equal to One-Fourth of Tangible
Assets and Held Equally by Ultimates and Financial Intermediaries
National assets =8%X national wealth
Financial interrelations ratio=2%
Share of financial intermediaries
=1
124SPECIMEN 7
Situation Similar to. United States in 1949
Business
Househo'ds
















National assets = 2 X national wealth
Financial interrelations ratio= 1
Share of financial intermediaries
•in national assets
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The only point in including these graphs is to bring home more
clearly than in the text how the share of tangible assets owned by
business, the extent of layering, and the size and distribution of the
dead-weight debt affect FIR and the share of financial interrnedi-
aries in national assets. Specimens 1 to 5 illustrate extreme cases, not
likely to be found in this pure form in actual life. Specimen 6, how-
ever, is a little more realistic, and Specimen 7, the most complicated
one, is roughly modeled after the situation in the United States in
1949, the last year for which a national balance sheet is available.
It is, of course, impossible to indicate a typical or normal value
for FIR. But it may be useful to show in Table 2 the values of FIR
which result from certain assumptions about the value of the main
determinants of the ratio, values which appear to be reasonable for
modem Western-type economies.
This table shows the wide range—one-third to three—in the
value of FIR that may arise without making unreasonable assump-
tions regarding the main determinants of the ratio. The range of
FIR encountered in actual application, however, is much smaller.
The share of business in tangible assets, for instance, will generally
be found to lie between one-fourth and one-half, and will exceed
one-half only in less-developed countries and if agriculture is re-
garded as part of the business sector. The share of financial inter-
mediaries in financing business is usually of the order of one-sixth
to one-third, while the layering ratios among nonfinancial business
enterprises and financial intermediaries more commonly range from
one and one-half to two. It is only the dead-weight debt ratio which
is actually found to have a wide range from virtually zero up to
one-half. FIR thus is likely to lie between one-half and one and one-
half when there is no dead-weight debt. It may rise to between one
and two and one-half in situations where a substantial dead-weight
debt, say of up to one-half of national wealth, is present.
For the analysis of a country's financial structure, and of changes
in it, there is particular interest in the relation between FIR and
the assets of financial intermediaries. This can be set forth in the
following formula, which also is sometimes useful as a rough. esti-
mating device when no comprehensive national balance sheet is
available.
A stands for total assets, T and I for tangible and intangible assets. Sub-
scripts on the right indicate holders, those on the left debtors (issuers); n
standsfor all groups, h for households, g for government, b for nonfinancial
business, f for financial intermediaries, sforforeigners, and oforall groups
except financial intermediaries.
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TABLE 2
Value of Financial Interrelations Ratio under Varying Assumptions
SHARE OF BUSINESS IN TANGIBLE ASSETS (p)
.25 .50
SHARE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES DEADWEIGHT DEBT RATIO (d)
IN BUSINESS FINANCING () 0 .25 .50 0 .25 .50
.25
.31 .441.56 .621.251.88 1.0Layering 1.0
Layering ratio





1.0Layering 1.0 .381.001.63 .751.382.00
Layering ratio




Source: Calculated from the formula
FIRflAb(d8+çb)Xf+2d
where & —proportionof dead-weight debt held by financial intermediaries.
This formula considerably simplifies the actual interrelations among groups;
e.g. by assuming that financial intermediaries and governments own no tangible
assets, that financial intermediaries are financed entirely by households and are
holding one-half of dead-weight debt, that there are no interrelations between
nonfinancial business and government, and that there is no layering among
households and governments.
The formula is derived by summing the assets of the four groups, which can
be expressed in the terms used in Table 2 (T =tangibleassets, i.e. national
wealth), dividing by T, and subtracting 1(since FIR has been defined as
[A/TJ —1),as follows:
Nonfinancial business: T + T(Xb —1)=TSXb
Government : Td
Financial intermediaries: Td + T9çb+(x,— 1)( Td& + Tp)
(Td + Tp)x










—14+ 4 + ,4—A,—,1,—/18
— T —
(Holdingsof claims against, and holdings of equity securities
of, financial intermediaries by domestic business, households,
and governments must be equal to total assets of financial
intermediaries less claims, etc., of financial intermediaries and
of foreigners.)
—A,—T,A, —,1,—,I04 + h + 010
— T0+ +T
—2A,T,+,I,+,184 ++ 010 +T





Since a is usually rather small (below .25), FIR may be said to
consist of two components. The first of them is slightly below twice
the ratio of financial intermediaries' assets to national wealth. The
second is the ratio of intra- and intergroup claims and equities of
other domestic sectors to national wealth, which consists mainly
of holdings of government bonds and of corporate securities by
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households and nonfinancial business enterprises, of individuals'
mortgage holdings, and of accounts receivable of business.8 The ad-
vantages of this formula are that total assets of financial intermedi-
aries are generally known or can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy, and that some or most of the components of the second
summand's denominator can also be estimated, even if often only
rather roughly. In this way FIR can be approximated in the absence
of a national balance sheet—the usual situation—when figures are
available on national wealth, assets of financial intermediaries, and
outstanding securities and mortgages. (In practice the item most
often unavailable is business accounts receivable.)
FIR, together with its components, particularly the dead-weight
debt ratio and the two layering ratios, is probably the most informa-
tive and simplest single measure of financial structure. But comple-
mentary ratios, which can generally be regarded as further sub-
divisions of FIR or its components, are necessary for fuller under-
standing of differences in financial structure between countries or
over time. Among these are:
1. The share of financial intermediaries in total national assets.
This is probably the best single indicator of the over-all importance
of financial institutions in the national economy.9
2. The share of (a) note-issuing institutions (central banks) and
(b) check-issuing banks in the assets of all financial intermediaries
and in national assets. These ratios are of considerable theoretical
importance and also turn out to be good indicators of the stage of
a country's financial development. Their significance lies in the
fact that they are rough measures of the share of nonmetallic money
in all intangible assets. Indeed, for some purposes just this latter
share may be preferable to the shares of assets of banks of issue
and commercial banks in total intangibles.
8. The share of the main groups of financial intermediaries in
aggregate assets of intermediaries and in total national assets. These
ratios provide rough indicators of the relative importance of the
different types of financial intermediaries and are therefore useful
in characterizing quantitatively a country's capital market organiza-
tion. The main groups to be distinguished—apart from central and
commercial banks—are savings banks and similar organizations (in
8Accuratecalculation, of course, would require some additional items such
as loans among households and, if regarded as an asset, tax accruals.
See Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Share of Financial Intermediaries in
National Wealth and National Assets, 1900-1949, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Occasional Paper 42, 1954.
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the United States, for instance, savings and loan associations and
credit unions); mortgage banks (a group poorly represented in the
United States but of great importance in some other countries);
insurance and pension funds, subdivided into private and govern-
ment organizations; and personal trust funds insofar as they are
under professional management (in the United States under the
administration of personal trust departments of commercial banks
and trust companies).
4. The ratio between intangible assets held by financial intermedi-
aries and those held by all other economic groups. The function of
this ratio is to indicate the degree of institutionalization of invest-
ment in intangible assets. The over-all ratio is usefully supplemented
by similar ratios for the main types of intangible assets which are
held in substantial amounts both by financial intermediaries and
by noninstitutional investors,viz, government bonds, corporate
bonds, corporate stocks, and mortgages.
5. The share of financial intermediaries in financing the different
sectors of the economy. These ratios are calculated, if national bal-
ance sheets but no sources-and-uses-of-funds statements are availa-
ble, as the share of a sector's borrowings from and its securities held
by financial institutions to the sector's aggregate liabilities and
equity. They may be regarded as a further breakdown of FIR.1°
6. Ratio of foreign financing. This ratio has been of minor im-
portance in the United States in the twentieth century, but in many
other countries it constitutes an important characteristic of the
financial structure, partly because it is the most important exogenous
factor in that structure.
7. The liquid asset ratio. This ratio, which compares liquid
assets, however defined, with total assets, is significant for individual
economic units and groups of them up to major sectors like non-
financial business or agriculture, but is of limited interest on a
national scale. Its importance, like that of the next three ratios, lies
primarily in the fact that it constitutes an important determinant of
economic behavior, particularly the ability and willingness to make
capital expenditures and the decisions to enlarge or curtail the scale
of output.
8. The ratio of price-sensitive assets, primarily tangible assets
and equity securities (including equities in unincorporated business
enterprises), to total assets,
10Wheresources-and-uses-of-funds statements are available, the ratios are
calculated from total sources of funds during a given period and funds supplied
by financial intermediaries, rather than from the balance sheet.
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9. The ratio of indebtedness to total assets. For analytical pur-
poses a subdivision into a short-term and a long-term debt ratio is
advisable.
10.Theleverage ratio, a combination of debt ratio and price-
sensitive asset ratio, which measures the percentage change in equity
resulting from a I per cent change in the level of asset prices. This
ratio, which can be refined in various ways, is useful as an indicator
of the effects of inflation and deflation on different sectors of the
economy.
11. The self-financing ratio, which is measured when only balance
sheets are available—rather unsatisfactorily if the statements are
based on original cost of assets—as the ratio of earned surplus to
total liabilities and equity. Calculation from a sources-and-uses-of-
funds statement as the proportion between total sources of funds
and retained earnings is preferable. This is one of the most im-
portant ratios characterizing financial structure, but it is not easily
available because balance sheets do not often permit a comparison
of earned surplus and total liabilities and equity unless calculated
throughout in constant prices, and because sources-and-uses-of-
funds statements are rarely available for a period long enough to
permit an estimate of the contribution of internal financing to total
assets or equity.
12. Concentration ratios, i.e. measures (preferably in the form of
Lorenz curves) of the extent to which total assets, total equity, or
other balance sheet items of the various sectors of the economy, or
of the entire nation, are concentrated in a relatively small number
of individual economic units. The broadest measures of this sort
are distributions of national assets or national wealth by size which
are familiar in the form of wealth distributions among individuals.
Similar distributions, of course, can be derived, and occasionally
have been, for assets or equity among corporations, among financial
institutions of a certain type, or among any other group of economic
units which is sufficiently homogeneous and in some sense competi-
tive to impart economic significance to the calculation. Concentra-
tion is generally measured on a national scale, but its study is often
as significant at the local level. To give only one example, the
concentration of commercial banks on the national level is much
more pronounced in most European countries which have nation-
wide branch banking systems than in the United States. It will,
however, be found that at the local level, i.e. for a given city or
trade area, concentration is often higher in the United States; in
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other words, the largest one, two, or three banks account for a
•higher proportion of total banking resources than they do in Europe.
Only FIR and a few of its components are dealt with in this paper.
Hardly any use at all will be made of the other ratios, i.e. those
listed under 5 to 12 above. The reason is simply that these ratios do
not seem to have been calculated in a systematic and comparable
way for a sufficient number of countries to permit international
comparisons. On the other hand, figures forthe United States, which
are available at least for several of these ratios, have not been
analyzed here, although they would fit into section 3, in order not
to extend this paper unduly and because they have been briefly
discussed elsewhere.'
3. Changes in the Financial Structure of the United States
The following summary discussion of some important measurable
changes in the financial structure of the United States over the past
100 years serves three modest purposes. The first is to illustrate the
application to one concrete case of the tools of financial morphology,
sketched in section 2. The second is to follow the changes in financial
structure that have accompanied one of the outstanding examples
of economic growth of an advanced country, and certainly the most
massive and enduring example: the United States since the middle
of the nineteenth century. The third is to provide a standard of com-
parison with the much rougher measures for a few other countries to
be.presented in section 4.
TRENDS IN FINANCIAL INTERRELATIONS RATIO AND COMPONENTS12
The FIR of the American economy, as it appears in column 1
of Table 3, has shown a definite upward trend, though by no means
an unbroken or regular one. Indeed, the movements of the ratio sug-
gest a series of steps rather than a smooth curve.
The ratio was undoubtedly low in 1850, as rough as the estimates
may be. It probably remained slightly below .5, indicating that
11 For liquid asset, price-sensitive asset, and debt ratios see Raymond W.
Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. x, Princeton University
Press, 1955, Introduction, Chap. VIII; and fur the share of financial intermedi-
aries in total supply of funds, "Financial Intermediaries in the Saving and
Investment Process in the American Economy, 1900-1952," National Bureau
of Economic Research manuscript, Chap. yin.
12 This section is taken with small changes from "The National Balance Sheet
of the United States," Income and Wealth, Series IV, Cambridge, Eng., Bowes
& Bowes for International Association for Research in Income and Wealth,
in press.
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TABLE 8
Trends in Financial Interrelations Ratio, United States, 1850-1952
SHARE OF FINANCIAL
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1922 .96 .56 .40 .15 .58
1929 1.24 .70 .54 .16 .56
1983 1.22 .81 .41 .18 .66
1989 1.21 1.00 .21 .22 .83










1, 21850, 1880:Very rough preliminary estimates.
1900-1949 :Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the
United States, Vol. in, Princeton University Press, 1955,
Part i.
1952 :Rough preliminary estimates.
3 1900-1952:Column 1less column 2;therefore understated by
(a/2) )< column 2.
4 1900-1952:Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Share of Financial in-
termediaries in National Wealth and National Assets,
1900-1949, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Occasional Paper 42, 1954, p. 97.
5 1900-1952:Column 2 divided by column 1; hence overstated by
(a/2) X column 2
column 1
intangible assets had a value of less than one-half of national wealth.
This is hardly astonishing. At that time financial institutions and
business corporations were still in their infancy, layering among
them was almost unknown, and the dead-weight debt was negligi-
ble. It is much more remarkable—and in need of explanation—that
the ratio apparently had hardly risen by 1880, although by that
time commercial and savings banks had attained substantial size,
railroad stocks and bonds had become common investment media,
and the federal government's dead-weight debt—the legacy of the
Civil War—was equal to nearly 5 per cent of national wealth.
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the financial
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interrelations ratio moved to a new and considerably higher level
of .8 to .9, at which it remained until the early 1920's. The rapid
expansion of finandial institutions in the fourth quarter of the nine-
teenth century and the sharp rise of security issues and security
prices in its closing years, together with a slight decline in the price
level of tangible assets, help to explain this increase in the financial
interrelations ratio. While most of the forces raising the volume of
intangible assets continued throughout the first two decades of this
century, their effect on the financial interrelations ratio was now
dampened by the doubling of the price level of tangible assets.13
This rise apparently was strong enough to neutralize the sharp in-
crease in intangibles and the creation of a dead-weight Treasury
debt of nearly one-tenth of national wealth during World War I.
The second sharp upward jump, which lifted the financial inter-
relations ratio in afewyears from 1.0 to over 1.2 in 1929, is easier
to explain. It reflects primarily the "frenzied finance" of the late
1920's with its unprecedented rise in the level of stock prices, far
beyond the current value of the underlying assets of corporations,
and its sharp increase in the extent of layering among financial in-
stitutions and other corporations, all in the face of stability in the
general price level.
The absence of movement of FIR between 1929 and 1939—even
in the depth of the depression in 1933—again is a little perplexing,
but probably is the result of offsetting tendencies. There was, on the
side of increasing the ratio, the expansion of financial intermediaries
after 1933, partly reflecting an increase in the federal government's
dead-weight debt from approximately 5 to 10 per cent of national
wealth. There was on the opposite side the collapse of the inflated
level of stock prices as well as a considerable shrinkage in the
volume of private debt. These movements in the volume of in-
tangibles—downward from 1929 to 1933, and upward in the follow-
ing six years—apparently were just of the same proportions as the
decrease and recovery in the value of national wealth, which chiefly
reflect changes in the price level of commodities.
13Onemight think that inflation, whether due to high dead-weight govern-
ment debt or other causes, could or would produce particularly high FIR's.
Their emergence, however, is prevented by the fact that open inilatiori also
increases the current value (replacement cost) of tangible assets, and does so
probably more rapidly than intangible assets grow. It is only in the case of
large-scale suppressed inflation, a combination not likely to endure for long
and one not yet encountered in the United States although approached in
1945, that extraordinarily high financial interrelations ratios may be expected.
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Between 1939 and 1949 the financial interrelations ratio under-
went the sharpest increase and the sharpest decrease of which we
have knowledge. The jump from 1.2 in 1939 to a peak of 1.7 in 1945
is, of course, chiefly a reflection of war inflation, which increased
the Treasury's dead-weight debt by $250 billion or 60 per cent of
prewar national wealth, and increased national assets still more
since a large part was placed with financial institutions and thus
appears two or more times in the national balance sheet. This alone
would have lifted FIR considerably. In addition, the rise in the cur-
rent (replacement) value of tangible assets was held down by price
controls and other devices accompanying a semisuppressed inflation.
The decline in the ratio between 1945 and 1949 is to a considerable
extent the effect of the belated rise in the general price level which
brought it more nearly into equilibrium with the expansion of the
supply of money during the preceding period. From 1945 to 1949
the volume of intangible assets expanded by only $120 billion (the
dead-weight debt actually declined by about 2 per cent of national
wealth), while the value of national wealth increased by $330 bil-
lion, almost one-half of which was the result of a rise in the price
level.
The further, though much slower, decline in FIR for the period
between 1949 and 1952, which reduces the ratio to not much more
than 1 and thus brings it back to the lowest level since the mid-
twenties, can probably be regarded as the tail end of the movement
that started after the end of World War II. The increase in intangi-
ble assets of approximately $200 billion again was below the rise
in the value of national wealth by $300 billion, but the absolute and
the relative size of the difference were considerably smaller than in
the 1945-1949 period.
Marginal FIR, i.e. the ratio of the increase in total assets between













Marginal FIR thus was reasonably stable at a level of slightly
above 1 from 1880 to 1939 with the exception of only the late
1920's. It was at unprecedentedly high levels during World War II,
the only pçriod of suppressed large-scale inflation which this coun-
try has experienced. The low ratios of the last seven years may be
nothing but the reaction to the spurt of 1935-1945, as marginal FIR
for the entire period from 1939 to 1952 (or from 1929 to 1952) is
on nearly the same level as the average of the preceding fifty to
sixty years.
The FIR of the United States thus shows three characteristics
(more intensive analysis will probably disclose others): (1) a gen-
erally rising trend over the last century; (2) movements in sharp
steps rather than along a smooth curve; and (3) a tendency to re-
main on a level or to decline—particularly in comparison with the
secular upward trend—while commodity prices rise, and to rise in
periods of stable or declining prices. (The main exception to the
third characteristic, the sharp rise in the ratio during World War II,
reflects large-scale semisuppressed inflation.)
These characteristics will be better understood if FIR is split
into two components,'4 the ratio of twice financial intermediaries'
assets to national wealth and the ratio to national wealth of the
inter- and intragroup intangibles of all other groups. The results
are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. Two facts should be re-
membered: first, the ratio of financial intermediaries' assets to na-
tional wealth is less unreliable than the two other ratios, particularly
than the ratio of inter- and intragroup intangibles of nonfinancial
business, households, and government; second, the first of the two
components into which FIR has been divided is somewhat overstated
and the second understated. The overstatement of column 2 is due
to its being entered at 2 x(A,/T),using the notation and argu-
ment of section 2, instead of at (2 —a) (A,/T),agenerallybeing
of the order of .2. The understatement of column S reflects both this
omission of afromcolumn 2 (since column S is the residual. of
columns 1 and 2) and the omission from the national balance sheet
of loans among individuals and some other intangibles not involving
financial institutions as holders or debtors. The effect of these two
adjustments, tbough each of them is of moderate size, on the share of
financial intermediaries in FIR is substantial. Thus the adjusted share
of financial intermediaries in 1952 may be estimated at 75 per cent
instead of the unadjusted value of 84 per cent, and the ratio of
'4See page 128above.
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intangibles excluding financial intermediaries to national wealth,
i.e. the second component of FIR, at .25 to .30 instead of .17.
Major trends are not affected by this adjustment.
This split discloses the striking fact—which cannot be wholly or
even mainly attributed to shortcomings of the figures—that the pro-
portion of financial intermediaries' assets to national wealth has
shown a pronounced upward trend since the turn of the century (a
trend known also to have been present in the second half of the
nineteenth century) whereas the ratio of other intangibles to na-
tional wealth has moved erratically—this may partly be due to short-
comings of the statistics—and has tended downward since the
thirties. In the United States it is thus the growth of financial inter-
mediaries' assets relative to national wealth that has dominated the
movements of FIR.
There is no opportunity here to attempt an explanation of the
reasons for the trends and fluctuations of shorter duration in the
two components of FIR. Such an attempt will be made for the
ratio of financial intermediaries' assets to national wealth in a
forthcoming monograph dealing with these institutions.15 The data
are probably, too scarce and as yet too little explored to do the
same for the ratio of other intangibles to national wealth. Suffice it to
suggest that the latter ratio is strongly influenced by the price move-
ment of common stocks, which constitute the largest intangible
asset in which financial intermediaries are not or are only little in-
volved (see peak of the ratio in 1929); by the vagaries of individuals'
holdings of dead-weight' government debt (see the bulge of 1945);
and by the apparently downward trend in the relative importance. of
business accounts receivable.
CHANGES TN 1IELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
There are at the present time in the United States approximately
two dozen reasonably distinct types of financial intermediaries,
each of which can be regarded as an organized channel through
which funds flow from savers to investors or among financial institu-
tions, viz. (1) the Federal Reserve System, (2) commercial banks,
(3) mutual savings banks, (4) the Postal Savings System, (5) credit
unions, (6) personal trust departments (including, common trust
funds), (7) savings and loan associations, (8) mortgage companies
and bankers, (9) land banks, (10) investment bankers and security
15 Goldsmith, "Financial Intermediaries ...," ascited.
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dealers, (11) life insurance companies, (12) fraternal life insurance
organizations, (13) property insurance companies, (14) closed-end
investment companies (including investment-holding companies),
(15) open-end investment companies (so-called mutual funds),
(16) federal social security funds, (17) state and local government
pension and retirement funds, (18) private (self-administered) pen-
sion and retirement funds, (19) sales finance companies, (20) per-
sonal finance companies, and (21) government lending institutions.
Only very few of these channels existed, or were of substantive
importance, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. An attempt
to indicate the decade in which each of the now more important
institutions first appeared is made in Table 416Datingof the first ap-
pearance of a new type of financial intermediary is usually definite,
though abortive or insignificant first attempts have occasionally
been disregarded. To assign a definite decade to "reaching maturity,"
in the sense of being fully developed technically and at the same
time having reached a size (naturally changing over time) that lifts
the institution out of the class of as yet untried experiments or of
apparent failures to develop, is, on the other hand, a most difficult
task, one that cannot be done without a good deal of arbitrariness,
and one that however done is likely to incur the disapproval of eco-
nomic historians. Yet the distinction is one that sometimes cannot be
ignored because of the long interval between the first appearance
of a new financial channel and its becoming a significant part of the
country's financial structure. (Savings bank life insurance, though
now nearly thirty years old, has not yet reached that status. Other
examples of an interval of two or three decades between first appear-
ance and maturity are provided by mutual savings banks, credit
unions, life insurance companies, and personal trust departments.)
We need note here only two features of Table 4, leaving the ex-
plorations of its details to readers interested in them.
The first of these is the pronounced gap in the introduction or
maturing of new financial channels in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. By 1850 most of the private financial institutions
that are now most important in terms of resources were akeady
well developed in the sense of operating with techniques basically
comparable to, although of course much more rudimentary and much
less varied than, those of today, and of covering the entire settled
area within the boundaries of the United States. This applies par-
ticularly to commercial banks, life insurance companies, and prop-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































erty insurance companies. Apart from mortgage companies, which
have never played a large role in the financial structure of the
United States,17 only one financial channel expanded so much dur-
ing the second half of the nineteenth century that it can practically
be regarded as a new one—investment banking. This evolution, how-
ever, was crucial for the changes in the country's financial structure
during this period. It meant the development of corporate securities,
both bonds and stocks, into one of the most important means—and
strategically if not statistically the most important one—of financing
economic expansion. It also meant that the bulk of the new securi-
ties were sold through the investment banking machinery to in-
dividual buyers in this country or abroad rather than to financial
institutions.18
The second feature is the concentration of the development of
new types of financial institutions in the 1920's for private and in
the 1930's for governmental organizations, particularly if attention
is directed toward maturation rather than experimental beginnings
The 1920's thus saw the development of investment companies, sales
finance companies, personal finance companies, and private pension
funds; the 1930's the rise of federal social security funds and federal
lending institutions.
Table 4 is only a first step in understanding the changes in the
financial structure of the United States during the past 100 years.
It has two defects in particular—it is nonquantitative, each type of
financial institution being implicitly treated as if it were of equal
importance with the others, and it says nothing about changes in
financial techniques and in functions and operations of institutions
retaining their formal identity. The second defect cannot be remedied
here except in issuing the warning that such changes in techniques
have been common and that they have been particularly pronounced
since the 1930's, when the lack of entries in Table 4 might give
the erroneous impression of absence of changes in financial struc-
ture. It may suffice to point to the development of direct placement
of securities, lease-back arrangements, competitive bidding for secu-
rities, government-guaranteed mortgages, and a secondary market for
17Itmay even be that these companies, or some similar organization, go
back to the late eighteenth century. See H. Parker Willis and Jules I. Bogen,
Investment Banking, Harper, 1929, p. 175.
18In1900, financial institutions (excluding personal trust funds administered
by banks and trust companies) held approximately 25 per cent of corporate
bonds and 3 per cent of stock outstanding (The Share of Financial Inter-
med iaries in National Wealth and Natiopal Assets, 1900-1949, as cited, Chap.
3, Tables 14 and 16).
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mortgages to forestall such a conclusion. The lack of quantitative
data on changes in financial structure in Table 4, on the other
hand, can be remedied, though only to a minor extent as space is
limited.' Indeed, all that can be done here is to look briefly at
the distribution of the total assets of financial intermediaries among
the main groups of institutions and at the structure of their assets
and liabilities. The first set of figures will show changes in the rela-
tive importance of different financial channels, while the second set,
to be discussed in subsection 3, tells us something—though far from
enough—about changes in the function of the different institutions
and in financial channels.
The relative importance of the main groups of financial institu-
tions, insofar as it is measured by their total resources, has shown
at least three major trends during the past century, which can be
followed in Table 5:
1. The share of commercial banks has declined considerably and
almost continuously. In the middle of the nineteenth century the
resources of commercial banks were approximately three times as
large as those of all other financial institutions put together. By
1900 commercial banks still had slightly more assets than all other
financial institutions. Another half century later their share in the
resources of all financial intermediaries was down to not much over
onethird. Since commercial banks combine the functions of money
creation (check deposits) and cloak-room banking (savings de-
posits), and do so to a degree varying over time, and since the share
of equity in total assets decreased considerably—from over two-
fifths in 1850 to less than one-tenth in 1950—it is not easy to ap-
praise this trend. In comparison with the assets of all financial
intermediaries, bank capital undoubtedly declined precipitously dur-
ing the 100 years ending in 1950 (from as much as 30 per cent in
1850 to S per cent in 1950), savings deposits increased between 1900
and 1950 (from 6 to 9 per cent) and probably did not change much
in the preceding fifty years, while demand liabilities (including
circulation) declined considerably between 1900 and 1950 (from
37 to 25 per cent) after probably having slightly increased between
1850 and 1900.
2. Insurance institutions have gained in importance, particularly
since the 1930's. They accounted for less than one-seventh of the
"Thesubject is dealt with more extensively in "Financial Intermediaries
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TABLE 5
Distribution of Assets of Financial Intermediaries in the United States, 1850-1949
(percent)
Institution 1850188019001912192919391949


















Life insurance companies 3.0 9.0 9.711.511.815.614.3
Property insurance companies
Private retirement and pension funds

































































b Includes investment and investment holding companies, mortgage companies, land banks,
and credit unions.
Source: 1850, 1880: Extremely rough estimates; 1900-1949: Raymond W. Goldsmith, The
Share of Financial Intermediaries in National Wealth and NationalAssets,1900-1949, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 42, 1954, p. 39.
assets of all financial intermediaries in 1912, but are now approaching
one-third.
8. Public financial intermediaries have likewise risen in iinpor-
tance, particularly if the Federal Reserve banks are put in this
category. Their share in total assets of financial intermediaries was
insignificant until World War I, but now amounts to almost one-
eighth excluding and over one-fifth including the Federal Reserve
banks. These figures, of course, are not adequate indicators of the
impact of government on the financial structure since they cannot
take account of the effect of government guarantees, particularly of
the guaranteeing of a large fraction of all mortgage loans outstand-
ing; or of government regulationof many features of financial trans-
actions, e.g. through the rules governing the investment of the funds
of most types of financial institutions and many aspects of corpora-
tion finance and trading in securities.
CHANGES IN FINANCIAL CHANNELS
1. Changes in Sources and Uses of Funds by Financial Inter-
mediaries. The structure of assets and liabilities of all financial
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intermediaries taken together,. which gives a clue to the sectors from
which they draw funds and the sectors to which they make funds
available, is shown in Table 6, though only for the past fifty years.
TABLE 6




Cash 15 13 11 22 16
U.S. government securities
Stateand local government securities








































































Unclassified liabilities 8 5 12 11 11
Total liabilities and net worth 100100100100100
Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Share of Financial Intermediaries in
National Wealth and National Assets, 1900-1949, NationalBureau of Economic
Research,Occasional Paper 42, 1954, Table 8,p. 45.
Several changes in financial channels can be inferred with reasonable
confidence from these figures:
a. An increasing proportion of total funds of financial intermedi-
aries has been channeled to the federal government. This trend
reached its peak in 1945 when one-half of the assets of financial
intermediaries consisted of United States government securities.
Seven years later the share had fallen back to not much over one-
third.2°
b. Mortgage loans, mostly made available to finance urban resi-
dential construction, have accounted for a declining share of all
funds supplied by financial institutions—one-fifth from 1900 to
1930, but not much over one-tenth in 1949.
20Figuresfor 1945 and 1952, not shown in Table 6, will be found in "Finan-
cial Intermediaries
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c. The most pronounced relative decline has occurred in the
financing of business, the share falling from approximately one-half
of total assets of financial intermediaries in 1900 to one-fourth in
1949. The decline in funds made available directly to business, how-
ever, has been much sharper in short-term loans than in purchase of
business securities in the open market or through direct placement.
d. Most of the funds with which financial intermediaries operate
have always been supplied by domestic households. The share of
business has shown a slightly declining trend from fully one-tenth
in 1900 to 7 per cent in 1949.
These trends are the results of a combination of the accounts of
more than a dozen different types of financial intermediaries, some
of which have shown considerable variations in behavior. More
adequate inferences on changes in. financial channels from the
balance sheets of financial intermediaries would require separate
treatment of the main intermediaries, which is out of the question
in a short paper like this.21
2. Changes in Distribution of Intangible Assets between Financial
Intermediaries and Other Groups. A more significant indication of
the nature of financial channels and changes in them is given by the
proportion of the main types of intangible assets held by financial
intermediaries. These figures, summarized in Table 7, indicate the
division of holdings of these assets between financial intermediaries
and all other groups taken together—i.e. in the case of securities and
mortgage loans, primarily nonf arm households. They do not by them-
selves measure, or even approximate, the share of intermediaries in
financing the various sectors of the economy. To do so sources-and-
uses-of-funds statements would have to be available for protracted
periods. What little information is now available on this point will
be reviewed below.
The outstanding feature of Table 7 is the increasing share of
financial intermediaries in almost all important types of intangible
assets since at least 1900, and probably since the middle of the
nineteenth century, though detailed quantitative evidence has not
yet been worked up for the period from 1850 to 1900. This increase
is most pronounced in the case of corporate bonds. By 1900, financial
intermediaries had provided only one-third of this form of financ-
ing for corporations. Fifty years later their share approached seven-
eighths. Combining all financing through securities and mortgages,
21Forbasic data and some discussion see 'Financia1 Intermediaries.. .
Chap.iv.
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TABLE 7
Share of Financial Intermediaries in Selected














































































Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Share of Financial Intermediaries in
National Wealth and National Assets, 1900-1949, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Occasional Paper, 42, 1954, p. 51, and worksheet data.
which together account for the bulk of all long-term financing, the
share of financial intermediaries increases from less than one-third
from 1900 to 1929 (not much over one-fourth if personal trust de-
partments are excluded, as the trustees have only limited control
over the funds) to three-fifths in 1949 and to still well over one-half
without personal trust departments. The institutionalization of finan-
cial channels which these figures reflect and measure is one of the
outstanding characteristics of the changes in this country's financial
structure over the past century.
3.Sources of Financing of Main Sectors. Probably the most im-
portant single characteristic of financial channels is the distribution
of total sources of funds among internal funds and external funds
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with the latter subdivided into institutional and other funds.' It is
this subdivision which determines, or reflects, the demand for funds
that appears in the market—internal financing obviously generates
no such demand, but quite on the contrary may increase the supply
of funds unless fully invested in tangible assets—and which also
indicates to what extent external funds have taken the detour
through financial intermediaries in reaching borrowers and issuers
of securities.
If the first half of this century is taken as a whole—a procedure
permissible only provisionally because of the great differences in the
economic character of subperiods—it appears that less than one-
fifth of the total net asset expansion of farm and nonfarm house-
holds, less than one-third of that of state and local governments and
of unincorporated business enterprises, but three-fifths of the net
asset expansion of nonfinancial corporations required external funds,
i.e. had to go through financial channels (Table 8). In the case of
the federal government the excess of current expenditures over
current income has been so great, i.e. internal financing has been
negative to such an extent, that external financing through the sale
of government securities is almost four times as large as total
financing. Combining these six sectors, it appears that saving (re-
tained net income) has financed a little less and external financing
a little more than one-half of net asset expansion; and that slightly
more than one-half of external financing or approximately 30 per
cent of net asset expansion has been provided by financial inter-
mediaries. These are the relations shown in Table 8; like all cal-
culations of this type, they are only rough approximations.23 Table
8, however, also provides a comparable breakdown of the sources
of financing for seven periods of five to twelve years' duration. It
will immediately be seen that there have been considerable changes
in sources of financing from period to period, some of which are
22 The calculation can be performed on a gross or a net basis, i.e. internal
funds may include or exclude capital consumption allowances. If the financing
of gross capital expenditures is under study, the gross approach is the one to
be used. In an analysis of net asset changes, however, net expenditure figures
are appropriate.
23 It should be noted that Table 8 eliminates capital gains and losses from
income and hence from internal financing, and is based on replacement cost
depreciation allowances which in this period are higher than the customary
original cost allowances so that internal financing represents a smaller pro-
portion of net asset expansion (which, of course, excludes revaluations) than
it would if the conventional treatment had been followed.
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Source Raymond W. Goldsmith, "Financial Intermediaries in theSaving and Investment
Process in the American Economy, 1900-1952," National Bureau of Economic Research
manuscript.
rather erratic. The main trends stand out more clearly if we dis-
regard the periods affected by wars and the Great Depression.
Column 3, the share of intermediaries in total financing, is pos-
sibly the ratio of most interest for a study of the capital market. In
what might be called "normal" periods (1901-1912, 1923-1929, 1934-
1939, 1946-1949) financial intermediaries have provided between
one-fourth and one-third of total net financing of nonfinancial cor-
porations. Their share has been somewhat lower, but also fairly regu-
lar, in providing funds to state and local governments. Fluctuations
are too wide and irregular to show anything like a normal level or
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a trend for the other groups, except possibly for nonfarm house-
holds, for which the increasing recourse to institutions in financing
the acquisition of houses and consumer durables has led to a rise
from less than one-tenth before 1922 to one-seventh in the 1920's
and after World War II.
4. International Sidelights
This sectiOn, I am aware, should discuss statistical measures of
financial structure in other advanced countries in a manner similar
to the treatment accorded to the United States in the preceding sec-
tion. That, alas, has been impossible, partly for lack of data and
partly for lack of time. There is only one country—the Netherlands—
for which a national balance sheet comparable in approach and in
detail to that constructed for the United States exists, but itis
available for only two recent dates (1989 and 1947-1948). For
Great Britain there are the somewhat rougher statements which Pro-
fessor Hicks has put together for 1982-1984 and 1947-1949. For all
other countries one would have to start practically from scratch
with occasional estimates of national wealth as the only substantial
help. In this situation it is entirely out of the question to present a
systematic comparison of measures of financial structure of the main
advanced countries over the last 50 to 100 years. It is not even
possible as yet to calculate FIR and its main components for all or
most advanced countries at any one recent date, though approxima-
tions could in most cases be made if one were willing to devote the
necessary time to the task. But such comprehensive coverage is
probably not required to obtain a preliminary picture of the quanti-
tative characteristics of differences in financial structure among ad-
vanced countries and the main changes in such structures since the
end of the nineteenth century. It may suffice for that purpose to look
at a few examples which, it is hoped, on the one hand will illustrate
situations of long-term economic equilibrium, using the years 1913
and 1938 as the last instances of an approach to such a state of affairs
in the Western World; and on the other will demonstrate the effects
of "abnormal" situations such as inflation followed by currency re-
form (Germany in 1925-1929 and 1948-1951) or of war losses and
war debts without monetary reform (Great Britain and the Nether-
lands in the late 1940's).
Because I regard whatever figures 1 shall use in this section as
purely illustrative I do not feel called upon to indicate in detail the
sources and methods from and by which they have been derived
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as I would if I intended to make a contribution to the financial his-
tory of the various countries used as examples. I hope, nevertheless,
that the order of absolute and relative magnitudes of the figures is
correct, and that they are sufficiently reliable for the limited use
that is made of them. If nothing else, the attempt to do work of this
type to a little more exacting standard for one country would keep
me from making any further-reaching claims for what follows.
AVANT LE DELUGE (mE WORLD OF 1913)
For many people, including I should think not a few economists,
the world of 1913 has the attraction that always attaches to a
"Golden Age"—an attraction that grows the further that age recedes
into the past. Standing at the end of what was truly saeculum
mirabile, if economic progress is the test, the years immediately be-
fore 1914 represent possibly the last period in which something
like long-term equilibrium prevailed; At the same time the period
is close to the earliest date at which the system of check .deposits
and multiple credit expansion, corporate predominance in major in-
dustries, and large-scale investment banking, the triad which char-
acterizes finance or security capitalism, had been fully developed for
a sufficiently long time—in most countries for one or two generations
—to be "mature."24 It is, therefore, doubly interesting to see how
the financial structure of the advanced countries looked in 1913,
even if this can be done at the moment only in a superficial and in
some respects an impressionistic way.
What Table 9 provides is indeed only a rough and unduly simpli-
fled picture, but I doubt whether better basic data—for which there
is a crying need—would invalidate the conclusion that the level of
FIR was approximately the same for the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, viz, a little bôlow 1, and was only slightly lower for the
United States and lower still for France. Similar rough estimates
could probably be prepared for a few other advanced countries for
which estimates of national wealth are available, but I have not had
the time to examine the relevant financial statistics.
Among components of FIR, one was reasonably similar among
countries—the share of the assets of the banking system in national
24 The word is used here not in the derogatory sense of stagnation and
senescence that has recently been attached to it by politicians but simply in the
sense of an economic society which has passed the experimental stage and has
reached a stable institutional pattern.
150FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES
TABLE 9
The Financial Interrelations Ratio and Its Components before World War I,
Selected Countries
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4.Government debt outside financial
institutions .02c .04 .07 .10
5.Domestic business securities outside
financial institutions .28 .18 .09 ...
6.Mortgages outside financial institutions.04 ... .08 ...
7.Foreign investments (gross)d .04 .26 .09 .18
a Includesother intangibles not covered in lines 2 through 7, particularly
business receivables. Does not include proprietors' equity in unincorporated
business; hence differs for United States from Table 3.
b Central, commercial, and savings banks.
CGovernmentsecurities alone are zero.
d Includes gold, direct foreign investments, and foreign investments held
by financial institutions.
wealth and assets.25 France again showed the lowest ratio.26 On the
other hand, differences were pronounced in the absolute level and
the relationships of the shares of other financial institutions, govern-
ment debt held outside of financial institutions, business securities,
mortgages, and foreign investments. It is, of course, just these dif-
ferences that reflect the variations of financial structure among
the four countries.
The share of financial institutions other than banks varied from
approximately .05 in the United States and France to .08 in the
United Kingdom and .15 in Germany. The particularly high German
ratio was due to the existence of a well-developed system of mort-
gage banks and credit unions—two types of institutions which are
virtually unknown in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where some of
their functions are discharged by commercial and savings banks,
and are of considerably smaller relative size in France. Differences
in the share of life insurance companies tended in the opposite
25will be remembered that this ratio (as does line 3) enters FIR at nearly
twice the value shown in line 2.
26 The differences are considerably smaller if national assets rather than
national wealth are used as denominator. In that case the ratios are .06 for
France against .06 for the United Kingdom, .07 for Germany, and .08 for the
United States.
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direction. Their share was relatively high in the United States and
the United Kingdom and relatively low in Germany and France.27
The differences are easiest to explain in the case of holdings of
government securities outside of financial institutions, primarily hold-
ings by individuals. Here the contrast is between the United States,
with only very small intangible assets of this type, and the three
European countries, with ratios varying from approximately .04
(United Kingdom) to .10 (France). This difference reflects pri-
marily variations in the ratio of total government debt to national
wealth or assets28 since at that time only a minority of that debt was
held by financial institutions. One must be careful, however, in draw-
ing inferences from the figures as they stand. The British and French
government debts had been incurred mainly by the central govern-
ment and were largely the result of military expenditures. Most of
the German government debt, on the other hand, had been con-
tracted by the Laender and much of it had been used to finance the
acquisition and expansion of the country's government-owned rail-
way system.
Differences were apparently marked and significant in the share
of domestic business securities (primarily corporate stocks and
bonds), but the estimates for this component of national assets un-
fortunately are particularly precarious, subject to incomparabilities
among countries,29 and missing for France. It is nevertheless unlikel,r
that better figures would basically modify the conclusion to be
drawn from Table 9 that the importance of domestic business securi-
ties among national assets and in relation to national wealth was
higher in the United States than in Europe, and among the three
European countries was much higher in the United Kingdom than
in Germany, France probably ranking last. One reason for these
differences is the larger share of business done by corporations in
the United Kingdom and particularly in the United States com-
pared with the Continent, but if the figures are even roughly cor-
27 It amounted to approximately .04 (of national wealth) in the United
Kingdom, .03 in the United States, .02 in Germany (.03 including social in-
surance organizations), and not much over .01 in France.
28 The share of total government debt in national assets was less than .03
in the United Kingdom, .05 in Germany, and .08 in France.
29 The American ratio is based on the market value of corporate securities
and the face value of corporate bonds; the German one on the market value
of corporate stock and the face value of corporate bonds and capital of
G.m.b.H.'s (organizations similar to British private companies); the British
ratio is based on the face value (rather than the market value) of capital of
public and private companies, and thus is too low.
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rect other factors must have been at work which I have not had
an opportunity to examine.80
The largest differences, finally, appear in, the share of foreign
investments and they are certainly not due to a statistical mirage,
rough as the figures are. The ratio of foreign investments (gross, in-
cluding gold) to national wealth was only .04 in the United States
against ratios of approximately .09 in Germany, .16 in France, and .26
in the United Kingdom. These figures cannot be used as measures of
the contribution of foreign investments to FIR without some down-
ward adjustment since some foreign investments are held by financial
institutions (and hence are already included in lines 2 or 3 of
Table 9) and others consist of tangible rather than intangible assets.
But even after such adjustments the differences among countries
would still be very great and the relations among the ratios for
various countries would probably not be much different from those
shown in Table 9.
Finally, to show how large differences in financial structure may
hide behind the same FIR, and to warn about the indiscriminate use
of the ratio, a comparison will be made between the United Kingdom
and Germany, using aggregate FIR as the basis:
United Kingdom Germany Difference
Total .95 .95 —
Bankingsystem (2 x) .25 .29 —.04
Life insurance (2 x) .07 .04 +.03
Other financial institutions (2 x) .10 .28 —.18
Government debt .04 .07 —.03
Mortgages small .08 (—.05)
Domestic business securities .19 .09 +10
Foreign investments .27 .10 +.17
GREAT BRITAIN
Up to World War I, or at least until close to the end of the nine-
teenth century, Great Britain occupied in the world of finance a
position similar to the one held by the United States since the end
of World War II, and possibly since as early as the 1920's—that of
the leading financial power, whose methods to a considerable ex-
tent set the tone and the standard. it is, therefore, very regrettable
that we are not yet in a position to provide an adequate quantitative
80Theshare of agriculture in total national assetsis a factor obviously
negatively related to FIR since agriculture is only rarely conducted in corporate
form except in colonial areas. This factor helps to explain the low FIR for
France and the United States in comparison with the United Kingdom, but
makes the high FIR of Germany more remarkable.
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picture of the financial structure of Creat Britain at its zenith. How-
ever, Hicks' statements of national assets and wealth, available for
1932-1934 and 1947-1949,'providea starting point for a picture of
the British financial structure under the influence of the Great
Depression and World War II and permit useful comparisons with
the United States.
TABLE 10
Selected Characteristics of Financial Structure,
United Kingdom and United States, Selected Years
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a Exceptfor line 9.
b Does not include proprietors' equity in unincorporated business; hence differs for United
States from Table 3.
Central, commercial, and savings banks.
d U.S. government securities alone are zero.
eIncludesgold, direct foreign investments, and foreign investments held by financial in-
stitutions.
The figures, as they are arranged in Table 10, seem to be good
enough, notwithstanding their numerous and all too obvious short-
comings—not Hicks' fault—to justify the following conclusions:
1. Both in 1913 and in 1933 the FIR of the United Kingdom was
only slightly above that of the United States. In 1949, however, the
British FIR was more than twice as high as the American, and this
was the result exclusively of a rise in the British ratio.
2. The rise in the British FIR between 1933 and 1948—as well
as the smaller advance from 1913 to 1933—is due primarily to a
sharp increase in the dead-weight debt ratio coupled with a moderate
increase in national wealth (which would be transformed into a
decline if account were taken of the rise in the price level), an in-
31 J R. Hicks, The Social Framework, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1942,p. 103;
1952, p. 109.
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crease which in turn reflects the effects of two World Wars on
domestic tangible assets and particularly on net foreign assets.
3. The components of FIR that have increased most in both coun-
tries, though much more so in the United Kingdom, are bank assets
and government securities held outside financial institutions, both re-
flections of the growth of dead-weight government debt.
4. The share of all financial intermediaries in FIR has increased
in both countries, and virtually to the same extent—rising from
slightly less than one-half in 1913 to two-thirds in the late 1940's.
5. In both countries the share of assets of insurance organizations
has increased steadily and strongly. It is now four times as high as
in 1913 both in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
6. Foreign assets (including gold) have contributed a declining
component of FIR in the United Kingdom, but constitute a rising
though still very small share in the United States.
FINANCIAL STRIJCtU1IE, INFLATION, AND CURRENCY DEFORM—DIE GER-
MANCASE
Changes in the financial structure of Germany over the last half
century are of particular interest because they show more clearly
than developments in any other advanced country the effects of
inflation and of currency reform accompanied by a radical sei-
sachtheia, and not once but twice. Again although the figures that
can be hastily put together from outside the country are very ap-
proximate, Table 11 suggests the following conclusions
1. In 1913, after half a century of rapid economic development,
Germany's FIR was quite similar to those of the United States and
the United Kingdom at slightly less than 1, but the share of financial
intermediaries in FIR was considerably higher.
2. Two years after the first currency reform, i.e. at the end of
1925, FIR at .35 was abnormally low for an advanced country. How-
ever, it was even lower at the end of 1948, half a year after the
second and still more radical currency reform. At that time FIR was
only slightly above .20, and a large part of this small ratio was at-
tributable to the assets of the central bank, reflecting essentially
the provision of the economy with a new currency.
3. Both post-reform levels of FIR were obviously not compatible
in the long run with the operation of an advanced economy. Hence
in both cases a rapid increase in FIR occurred. However, the ratio
was still far below the 1913 level six years after the first and four
years after the second currency reform when the economy had been
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•TABLE 11
Selected Characteristics of Financial Structure, Germany, 1913-1951




















Assets. of insurance organizations
Assets of financial
.03 .01 .02 .04 .01.01
institutions (2><) .57 .20 .45 .60 .16 .28
5.Government debt outside .
financial institutions .07 .02 .04 .03 .01 .02
6.Domestic business securities
outside financial institutions .09 .06 .09 .07 .02 .04
7.Mortgages outside financial
institutions . .08 .01 .02
.
.02. .01 .01
8.Total government debt .10 .05 .07 .07 .05 .05
9.Share of financial institutions .
in FIR . . .60 .57 .69 .75 .73 .70,
a Exceptfor line 9. ,
b Central, commercial, and savings banks.
fairly completely. restored in a physical sense. Indeed, notwithstand-
ing considerable further expansion of the financial network after the
Great Depression, FIR in 1938, i.e. fifteen years after the first cur-
rency reform, was still slightly lower than before World War I..
4. As in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the share
of financial intermediaries in FIR increased from 1913 to the present
time, but much less pronouncedly. Although the 1913. share was
higher than in the United States or' in the United Kingdom,. the
present share is on the same. level as in the two other countries.
5. The effects of the two inflations are particularly visible in the
ratio of the assets of insurance organizations. The long-term trend
toward an increase in the ratio was obviously also at work in Ger-
many, but it was sharply interrupted twice by inflation and currency
reform. As a result, the ratio at the middle of the century was still
well below the 1913 level.
6. The sharp expansion in the proportion of dead-weight govern-
ment debt to national wealth and national assets, which is char-
acteristic of developments in the United States and the United
Kingdom in the twentieth century—as well as in most other ad-
vanced countries—and which is largely responsible for the rise in
FIR and the increase of the share of financial intermediaries in it,
is entirely absent in Germany. Twice a very heavy national debt was
piled up, but twice it was almost entirely eliminated.
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THE NETHERLANDS
This short list of "case studies" in national financial structure may
be brought to a close with the Netherlands for the reason, already
mentioned, that even though it is not as large or typical an economy
as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, or France, it is the
only country which seems to have a national balance sheet very
close in concept and detail to that used in section 3 for the United
States. The comparison, unfortunately, must be limited to the late
1930's and 1940's as no attempt seems to have been made to draw
up a comparable statement for the Dutch economy at an earlier
date. Table 12 shows the relevant figures.
TABLE 12
Selected Characteristics of Financial Structure,
Netherlands and United States, 1939 and 1947-1949
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a Basedon J. B. D. Derksen, A System of National Book-keeping Illustrated
by the Experience of the Netherlands Economy, National Institute of Economic
and Social Research, Occasional Paper x, 1946, p. 19.
b Based on Statistische en Econometrische Onderzoekingen, 1949,pp. 9 if.
CDoesnot include proprietors' equity in unincorporated business; hence
differs for United States from Table 3.
ciCentral,commercial, and savings banks.
Includes gold, direct foreign investments, and foreign investments held by
financial institutions.
In 1939, FIR was slightly lower for the Netherlands than for the
United States, due chiefly to the relatively smaller size of assets of
the banking system. Claims against insurance organizations and
corporate securities (chiefly stocks) held outside financial institu-
tions were also of less importance in the Netherlands. Foreign invest-
ments, as well as mortgages and government debt held by individ-
uals, on the other hand; bulked considerably larger.
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At the end of 1947, in the midst of the reconstruction following
World War II, FIR for the Netherlands had sharply risen to ap-
proximately 1.60,wellabove the United States ratio for 1949 of
1.22. The higher value of FIR is due primarily to the higher dead-
weight debt ratio in the Netherlands, which in turn is partly attrib-
utable to heavy war damage compensation claims accounting for
12 per cent of tangible assets. The relatively heavy weight of gov-
ernment debt affects FIR twice: first, by raising the holdings of
government debt by households and business (Table 12, line 5); and
second, by increasing the assets and deposits of the banking sys-
tem (line 2). Of the other components of FIR two, business securities
held outside financial institutions and the assets of insurance institu-
tions, are practically equal in both countries. The third and smallest
component, mortgages held by households and business, is con-
siderably more important in the Netherlands than in this country,
because in the Netherlands most mortgages are still held by in-
dividuals, while they are found mostly in institutional portfolios in
the United States.32' 33
If allowance is made for this greater dead-weight debt, which
is largely a legacy of World War II, the national financial structure
of the Netherlands is thus seen to be essentially similar to that of
the United States with one important exception—foreign investments
constituted only a very small proportion of national assets or na-
tional wealth in the United States, but were of great importance in
the Netherlands.
5. In Place of a Conclusion
This paper, it must be admitted, has not shed much light on the
influence of financial structure on economic growth. All that we
can possibly derive from the cursory review of changes in financial
structure of the leading "advanced" countries reflected in certain
ratios derived from national balance sheets are suggestions of a few
trends in finance that have accompanied economic growth in West-
ern communities since the industrial revolution:
1. The financial interrelations ratio, i.e. the ratio of intangible
assets to national wealth, has shown a secular tendency to rise.
32 Total mortgages are of equal importance in both countries—7 per cent of
national wealth.
Another item of considerably larger weight in the Netherlands in 1949 is
tax accruals, which are estimated at 13 per cent of national wealth (3 per cent
for business and 10 per cent for households) against only 2 per cent in the
United States. This item reflects extraordinary tax arrears and unpaid in-
stallments on two capital levies.
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2. Advanced countries since the turn of the century rarely have
shown FIR of substantially less than 1.
8. A high FIR—say, in excess of i3—has been found only in
connection with a large dead-weight government debt, i.e. after
prolonged and expensive wars.34
4. Before the Industrial Revolution, intangibles took the form
predominantly of loans among individuals, unincorporated busi-
ness enterprises, and governments. Financial intermediaries were
almost entirely absent. The first intermediaries to acquire substan-
tive importance—measured by their assets in comparison with na-
tional assets—were banks of issue. Commercial banks (banks of de-
posit) followed. In the first century after the Industrial Revolution—
i.e. in Western Europe and North America until approximately the
middle of the nineteenth century—financial intermediaries other
than banks remained small and played only a subsidiary role in the
financial structure.
5.Sincestatistics have been available, i.e. since late in the nine-
teenth century, the share of the banking system in national assets
and its contribution to FIR have had a tendency to decline.
6. Within the banking system the proportion of assets held by the
central bank of issue generally shows a declining trend. Both this
trend and the decline in the share of the banking system in national
assets mean that the same monetary base has come to support a
larger financial superstructure. They also mean that money creation
through the banking system has lost in importance as a method of
financing. These tendencies, however, have been reversed during
wars.
7. The share of insurance organizations, both private and public,
in FIR has tended to rise.
8. The status of an "advanced" country is compatible with quite
different financial structures in the sense of differences in the ratio
(to national wealth or national assets) of the assets of financial in-
The rise in prices of tangible assets that generally accompanies large-scale
war expenditures might be thought to prevent a substantial increase in FIR.
It should be remembered, however, that an increase in government debt held
by financial institutions leads to at least twice as large an increase in the
absolute value of national assets, and that usually part of the total government
debt during a war is absorbed outside of the banking system and does not
result in an increase in the money supply. Indeed, it would be only if the
money. supply were increased by the full amount of the government debt that,
abstracting from changes in velocity of circulation and volume of real output,
the value of tangible assets could be assumed to increase in the same pro-
portion as the money supply with the result that the increase in dead-weight
debt would not lift FIR.
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stitutions and of government debt, business securities, and mort-
gages held outside financial institutions. Apparently, however, no
country has moved into the "advanced" category without a banking
system of substantial size (say, with assets of at least one-tenth of
national wealth), without corporations' accounting for a large part
of all business done, with a high level of interest rates (say, in ex-
cess of 5 or 6 percent for high-grade bonds), while it was undergoing
secular inflation, without a substantial ratio of national saving and
capital fonnation (say, at least one-tenth), and unless a substantial
proportion of business expansion has been financed out of retained
earnings.85
Even if it should turn out that all or virtually all advanced coun-
tries have, during the twentieth century, actually met the tests set
forth above, it still would have to be established that the same tests
have not also been met by less advanced or "underdeveloped"
countries.
C 0 M M E N T
EDWARD S. SHAW, Stanford University
The general subject of Goldsmith's paper is the connection be-.
tween the level of capital formation and the channels and practices
by which investors obtain access to financial resources. The initial
question posed is the connection between physical assets and the
debts and claims to which the accumulation of physical capital (and
other activities) has given rise. The principal measure of this rela-
tionship, which the author considers an index of financial maturity,
is the financial interrelations ratio and certain of its statistical com-
ponents. These indexes express the national net accumulation of
debts as a ratio of the value of physical assets. They pertain ex-
clusively to the structure of balance sheets, bypassing both flow
patterns and price relationships, two varieties of index which, we
all know, have been used more commonly to measure financial
maturity.
Goldsmith's second objective is to show that a country which is
relatively mature in its accumulation of physical assetsisalso
The last four characteristics have not been substantiated in this paper.
Evidence on interest rates is hardly required; that on the national saving and
capital formation ratio will be found in Kuznets' paper. There really is not
enough material for a considered statement on the share of self-financing for
more than a few advanced countries and for more than a few periods, or on
the share of corporations in business done.
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mature in its financial accumulation, in the sense that its FIR is
relatively high and that at least some of its components tend to fall
into a distinct pattern. One of his results is that "Since the turn of
the century, advanced countries rarely have shown FIR of sub-
stantially less than 1"; another is that in advanced countries financial
intermediaries other than banks tend to gain an increasing share of
total financial assets. Goldsmith does not indicate whether and, if so,
how physical maturing and financial maturing are mutually stim-
ulative.
The study is rewarding to the rest of us in various ways. It is a
prime example of empiricism, based on the premise that "naturally"
an examination of the links between finance and growth "should run
in quantitative terms." It provides ingenious indexes for measuring
financial development both aggregatively and partially. It suggests
fascinating new insightsinto economic history and historical
methodology. It pinpoints important instances in which long-run and
short-run analysis must be concurrent. While its own objective is
limited, references to the larger work indicate that important ana-
lytical developments are under way there.
The first issue on which one might attempt constructive criticism
is dead-weight debt. Goldsmith's general definition is this: dead-
weight debt increases national assets in a combined balance sheet,
but does not directly affect the level of national wealth in a con-
solidated balance sheet. The statistical definition is more restricted,
apparently including only the outstanding debt of national govern-
ments. His central conclusions regarding dead-weight debt are
that it bears a high proportion to national assets and national wealth
in most advanced countries and that it is largely responsible for the
complex and powerful network of financial intermediaries in ad-
vanced countries.
May I suggest, first, that "dead-weight debt" is an ambiguous
category of debt. It is always perilous analytically to try to match
increments in specific debt forms with increments in specific assets.
Moreover, any of the usual definitions of dead-weight debt leaves
one at a loss as to how to classify debt in many specific cases. What
of private debt incurred in hyperinfiation that results only in price
advances rather than in increases in the substance of wealth? What
of private debt incurred simply to improve liquidity? My question
is whether dead-weight debt is really identifiable for quantitative
analysis.
Is dead-weight debt really dead? It is arguable that the existence
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of government securities in some circumstances relieves private bor-
rowers of the need to issue their own securities for the purchase of
physical assets. If public debt were not as high as it is, private debt
might be higher.. Is the public debt dead if it displaces live private
debt?
In other cases outstanding public debt provides collateral or
secondary reserve without which private debt would not be issuable
for financing tangible assets. If it were not for the "dead" debt,
there could not be as much "live" debt. I doubt whether conceptually
or statistically securities can be put into two boxes marked dead
and alive.
In his present paper Goldsmith indicates some uncertainty in the
theoretical aspects of public debt. At one point (footnote 6) he
suggests that the issue of public debt in large amounts is invariably
accompanied by inflation, with or without lag, possibly in sufficient
degree to lower FIR—the ratio of financial assets to tangible assets.
At a later point (page 3, especially footnote 34) he concludes that
high FIR's are found only in connection with large public debt, and
denies that government borrowing is likely to bring inflation ade-
quate to stabilize or lower FIR. A country becomes financially "ad-
vanced" if it has had heavy public borrowing and if the effect of this
dead-weight debt on FIR is not erased by inflation in commodity
prices. We are told that the demand for government securities at a
stable price level is both a function of the stock of real wealth and
not such a function.
These issues of dead-weight debt seem to call for theoretical medi-
tation before statistical measurement. Although I have not meditated
seriously about debt theory, I recommend discarding the "dead-
weight" concept in favor of some other way of classifying securities.
I am confident that in his larger work Goldsmith will infuse some
of the life of demand and supply analysis into his study of financial
growth processes. It is interesting to speculate about, and even to
examine empirically, the needs and desires of both buyers and sellers
that have created markets for the accumulating mass of securities.
Goldsmith tells us that securities do accumulate; that they are
diversified in changing patterns and dispersed in changing propor-
tions among various holders; that the accumulation, diversification,
and dispersion can be measured; and that these measures can be put
alongside those of physical accumulation. He has taken this me-
chanical step so expertly that one anticipates keenly what he will
have to say about the economics of financial accumulation.
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Financial assets would not accumulate in real-value terms if there
were not willing holders. Financial intermediaries would not multi-
ply if there were not a real demand for their services. They are not
simply layers in a pyramid of security issuers and owners; they
have distinctive services to sell. Where does the demand for these
services come from, and is their emergence a part of the growth
process? Accumulating securities are in effect the capital equip-
ment, or part of it, for certain service industries. How do profitable
opportunities arise for these industries?
To begin with, one may speculate that physical accumulation and
rising real income per capita generate effective demands for money
balance in notes and deposits, for savings media that do not require
managerial skills, for insurance of property and life and health.
In other words, rising real income generates demand for services of
such financial intermediaries as commercial banks, savings banks,
and insurance companies. Equalization in income distribution may
tend to shift the balance of personal demand for savings media
away from stocks and bonds and mortgages to, say, insurance poli-
cies, government securities, and savings and loan shares. Thus the
general public releases stocks and bonds to insurance companies and
savings banks so that the latter can provide savings media that
cater to the popular taste. Again, cyclical instability may intensify
the public's demand for security in the form of unemployment
insurance or gilt-edge vehicles for saving, opening market opportuni-
ties for insurance companies, pension funds, and savings banks.
Rising FIR and a proliferation of financial layers, then, are
partly a response to real demands for new services. These demands
are generated in the growth process. To a degree they may develop
comparably in different countries, but one should also expect their
complex and changing pattern to reflect peculiar aspects of the
growth process country by country. My impression is that an early
effort to incorporate them in a tentative theory of growth would
lead to some interesting experiments in assembling and manipulat-
ing statistics.
Here and there in Goldsmith's paper one finds tantalizing sug-
gestions that there are equilibrium levels and disequilibrium levels
for his financial ratios. There are hints that forces can be identified
which tend to restore an equilibrium once disturbed. Thus he speaks
of FIR ratios that are not "compatible in the long run with the
operation of an advanced economy." He refers to "situations of
long-term economic equilibrium" in which presumably FIR's are
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not distorted by recent spurts in dead-weight debt. One has the
impression that Goldsmith may have thought more than he admits
of economic forces that are somehow regulated by the reserve ratio
of real assets to paper assets. In his present paper, analysis of
equilibria and disequilibria seems to be inhibited by the working
principle that investigation of the role of finance in growth "nat-
urally should run in quantitative terms...."
Experimentally,one might hypothesize that at any given stage
of development in per capita real income in any given institutional
setting there is a normal FIR. At any higher stage of development
this same FIR would be too low—below equilibrium. At any lower
state of development it would be too high—above equilibrium. Gold-
smith warns us that these normal levels cannot be identified, ex-
cept possibly for 1913 and 1938, but he seems to feel that they may
exist.
What happens in disequilibrium? How, for example, is a sub-
normal FIR corrected and with what consequences for both the
real rate of growth and the financial rate of growth? This may be
a matter of pressing interest, since in Goldsmith's tables 1952 seems
to be a subnormal year in the United States. A subnormal FIR can
be raised by a flurry of security issues, by a boom in security prices,
or by a fall in reproduction costs of real assets—i.e. by an inflation
of financial assets or a deflation of real assets. To put it another way,
either interest rates can be forced down to inflate security prices
and stimulate security issues, or interest rates can be put high and
commodity prices forced down to deflate real production costs and
retard the rate of real accumulation. Goldsmith's data seem to say
that 1880 and 1922 as well as 1952 were years of subequilibrium
FIR's. After 1880, security issues and prices rose notably. The sequel
was repeated in the 1920's. Let us hope that the possible imbalance
of 1952 will be corrected in the same way rather than by a goods
deflation. The present Treasury view in this country appears to
prefer the latter solution.
An excessively high FIR may indicate a complex imbalance that
induces debtors and creditors to adjust debt and asset positions.
The correction comes, as Goldsmith illustrates, by debt cancellations,
by deflation of security prices, by inflation of commodity prices.
Given time, such an imbalance might be corrected by the relatively
slow processes of real economic growth. That is, an economic sys-
tern might grow up to a high FIR. The likeithood is, though, that
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inflation would have to be held in check during the growing-up
period by price controls and allied devices.
As a minor aside, reasoning about the equilibrium value of FIR
might help to soive an old puzzler, When is a debt a burden? The
answer may be that debt is burdensome when it is either too large
or too small in relation to the value of real assets. It is not burden-
some when FIR is at equilibrium level for the given stage of develop-
ment. If an equilibrium level of FIR is conducive to economic
growth, society may tolerate, even need, not only a rising total of
debt but a rising ratio of debt to wealth and incOme.
Goldsmith comments that FIR has risen not continuously but
by jumps. There may be something in the physiology of growth
that requires this; or there may be some discontinuities in Gold-
smith's statistics; or the considerable variation in the length of in-
tervals in his table may be responsible for it. But the explanation
could also be that some of the FIR values are close to the equilibrium
trend line and others are more or less remote from it. A time series
ineludin disequilibrium values should hardly be expected to cling
closely to a smooth trend curve. The values of FIR for 1880, 1922,
1945, and 1952 might well be significant deviations from equilibrium
values.
I have been suggesting that one way to think about the role of
finance in economic growth would be to define the implications of
an equilibrium level of FIR, to study the sources of disequilibrium,
and to work out the nature of adjustments that restore equilibrium.
Monetary theory, as we know it, may have been a rather good
approximation of this kind of analysis when money constituted a
larger proportion of outstanding securities and when banks were
relatively more important as sources of finance than they are now.
Goldsmith's data bring out the relative decline of money among
financial assets and of banks among financial institutions. I take
this to mean that traditional monetary theory is in need of reorienta-
tion. Perhaps it should be renamed "debt theory" or "financial
theory," taking for its area of competence supply and demand func-
tions for all securities including money. Its responsibility would
be to examine the nature of market equilibrium and the processes
of adjustment to disequilibrium for financial assets generally.
We may take it for granted that Goldsmith will devise other meas-
ures of financial structure and development than he presents in
this fragment of his work. These particular ones, and especially
FIR, are not very sensitive to the forces, perhaps some of them
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financial, which account for wide differences in per capita income
between, say, the United States and the United Kingdom or Ger-
many. Moreover, the differentials in income suggest that among
the several countries there are significant differences in demand for
the services of financial intermediaries. If this is so, there should
be more evidence of it than one finds in Goldsmith's data.
A supplementary measure would be an incremental FIR. Existing
aggregates of securities and of real assets are so very large that, in
an average FIR, they conceal degrees of difference in rates of
financial and physical accumulation. I would think, too, that some
explicit use should be made of the structure and level of interest
rates as a measure of financial development. On his final page,
Goldsmith comments that a high level of interest rates is not con-
genial to. financial or physical maturing. Income measurements
would not be superfluous—income originating in financial activity,
the relative importance of income of independent proprietors as
against interest and dividends, the distribution of interest and
dividends between foreign and domestic recipients, the ratio be-
tween gross and net interest, etc. One may hazard the guess that
some of these measures would bring out more clearly the relative
roles of finance in advanced countries. Until they have been ex-
plored, I would hesitate to accept Goldsmith's doubts concerning
the role of finance in stimulating a comparatively high rate of
growth in this country.
REPLY BY THE AUTHOR
I have taken account of some of Shaw's very helpful comments
quite inadequately by means of a few minor changes in the text
and a couple of footnotes. Unfortunately, I cannot do anything at
this time about his basic suggestion of a closer tie between the
analysis of financial growth and standard demand, and supply
theory, e.g. by defining equilibrium levels of FIR or by connecting
the level of FIR with the character of the demand for the services
of financial intermediaries. Such a tie is certainly desirable, but it
would call for a far-reaching expansion, rearrangement, and re-
vision of the entire paper. This leaves just one or two comments or
interpretations of Shaw's that I would not accept, although my
formulation in the original draft may have been responsible for his
•making them.
FIR and the other measures used in the paper are at this stage
quite empirical. There is no implication that a rising FIR necessarily
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measures the approach to financial maturity. Nor is there intention
of establishing, or even asserting, that maturity in a country's ac-
cumulation of physical assets and maturity in its financial structure
go together. (Indeed, I would not know how to define the former.)
Similarly, there is no implication that financial maturity is neces-
sarily connected with the existence of a large dead-weight debt.
Maybe Shaw was misled as to my stand by the fact that all the
advanced countries I used by way of example have at one time or
another had a large dead-weight debt. But such a debt is not
part of the definition of a financially advanced country. There cer-
tainly are cases of financially advanced countries having only a
very small government debt, dead-weight or productive—for ex-
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